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Abstract Since 2003, a series of over eighty sensors has been installed at Turtle
Mountain, site of the 1903 Frank Slide. The purpose of these instruments is to both
characterize and provide warning for a second large rock avalanche from the eastern face
of the mountain, where various unstable masses have been identified. Although studies
continue on the mountain to better understand the deformation patterns and interpretations
of the slope kinematics, significant effort has been expended to develop a structure for the
warning and emergency response that clearly outlines not only responsibilities and com-
munications protocols during an emergency, but also day-to-day operational responses and
procedures to ensure that the system remains operational. From a day-to-day operational
perspective, a systematic and repeatable set of procedures is required in order to ensure that
not only are data trends reviewed and reported on, but scheduled checks of system func-
tionality are undertaken. An internal Roles and Responsibilities Manual has been devel-
oped to clearly outline responsibilities for geoengineering, information technology (IT),
and management staff to ensure that system checks are completed and that support is in
place on a 24/7 basis should components of the system cease to operate properly or should
unacceptable deformations require review. In addition to that, a clear and concise trou-
bleshooting manual has been developed. This document provides simple diagnoses of
problems within the system and a clear roadmap of how to fix each component. From a
warning and emergency response perspective, a series of color-coded alert conditions has
been developed should unacceptable deformations be observed. At each alert level, clear
responsibilities for actions and communications have been identified for geoengineering
staff, provincial emergency management authorities, municipal officials, and first
responders. This has been documented in the emergency response protocol. All documents
described here are ‘‘living’’ documents that are updated on a regular basis as changes to
the system are made. An annual mock warning exercise has been developed and run in
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order to test responses to a hypothetical emergency and generate updates to the system
documentation.
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Abbreviations
24/7 24 h/day, 7 days/week
AEMA Alberta Emergency Management Agency
AGS Alberta Geological Survey
AT Alberta Transportation
BPB Blairmore Provincial Building
CPR Canadian Pacific Railway
Dgps Differential Global Positioning System
EDM Electronic Distance Measurement
EOC Emergency Operations Centre
ERCB Energy Resources Conservation Board
ERP Emergency Response Protocol
FSIC Frank Slide Interpretive Centre
GOA Government of Alberta
GPS Global Positioning System
IT Information Technology
MEP Municipal Emergency Plan
MCNP Municipality of Crowsnest Pass
NOTAM Notice to Airmen
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SLA Service Level Agreement
SME Subject Matter Expert
SOLGEN Solicitor General
TMMS Turtle Mountain Monitoring
1 Introduction
Located in southwestern Alberta, Canada (Fig. 1), Turtle Mountain is the site of the
famous 1903 Frank Slide, which buried parts of the town of Frank and killed over 70
people (McConnell and Brock 1904). Subsequent studies (Allan 1931) of the remaining
portions of the mountain highlighted a series of large cracks around the South Peak and the
potential for another large rock avalanche to be mobilized. Studies by Allan (1931) and
BGC Engineering Inc (2000) estimated that a failure of the mass at South Peak could
potentially release a volume up to 5 million cubic meters of material and impact on
municipal development and infrastructure below.
Although numerous attempts at monitoring the unstable areas (Anderson and Stoliker
1983; Cruden 1986; Fraser 1983; Kostak and Cruden 1990) have been undertaken since the
early 1900s, there was not conclusive evidence of the overall movements of the peak and no
way to provide a predictive warning should an acceleration of movements occur. In 2003,
during a ceremony marking, the centennial of the Frank Slide, the Government of Alberta
(GOA) committed $ 1.1 million (CDN) to design and deploy a real-time monitoring system
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and develop a warning and response plan for the Municipality of Crowsnest Pass (MCNP).
This system was deployed between 2003 and 2005 (Read et al. 2005). Since 2005, the
Alberta Geological Survey (AGS) has been responsible for the ongoing maintenance and
expansion of the sensor network, interpretation of data, and developing internal protocols
for early warning and emergency response. This study provides an overview of the structure
of the monitoring and warning system and provides detail on the various components that
are required to provide an effective response in the event of an emergency.
2 Project overview
The South Peak of Turtle Mountain is circumscribed by a series of long, deep cracks (Fig. 2),
which are believed to have formed as a result of the 1903 Frank Slide. Detailed studies of
the cracks and structure of the mountain led John Allan (1931, 1932, 1933) to estimate in
1933 that a second slide with a volume of approximately five million cubic meters could
take place. Allan (1931) also used empirical relationships derived from the experience of
the 1903 slide to estimate the potential run out zone for a second slide, with the worst case
scenarios crossing both the highway and the Canadian Pacific Rail (CPR) mainline.
Fig. 1 Location of Turtle Mountain in Alberta (location indicated with a star) and full-extent aerial view of
the Frank Slide. The dashed line below South Peak, Turtle Mountain, defines the area identified as being
most unstable. Photographs reproduced with permission from Alberta Sustainable Resource Development,
Air Photo Distribution. Image owned by the Government of Alberta and protected under the Copyright Act
of Canada
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Recently, more detailed assessments were carried out by BGC Engineering Inc (2000) and
Hungr Geotechnical Research (2007, 2008) to provide a refinement of the run out esti-
mations. However, these studies indicate the same elements, as outlined by Allan (1931),
are at risk. In spite of the risk, development restrictions were never placed on the areas
outside the 1903 slide. As a result, numerous residential developments were built in the
potential run out zone. Figure 3 provides outlines of the various scenarios discussed earlier.
In an effort to manage the risk associated with a large rock avalanche from South Peak,
the GOA commissioned the installation of a near real-time monitoring and warning system
on the South Peak of Turtle Mountain (Read et al. 2005; Moreno and Froese 2006).
Installation of the initial components of this system was completed in spring 2005, and
overall responsibility for the long-term monitoring of the mountain then transferred to the
AGS. Since then, significant effort has gone into assessment of the system functionality
and reliability, review of the data stream, optimization of the system, and documentation of
these items in a series of annual reports (Moreno and Froese 2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a,
2009b). As well, the AGS has also spent considerable effort in developing clear roles for
short- and long-term responsibilities for system operation and maintenance (Moreno and
Froese 2009a), responsibilities, and roles for staff during a heightened alert condition or
emergency and worked closely with provincial and municipal emergency responders to
develop clear plans for communications and roles in the event of an emergency (Alberta
Emergency Management Agency 2008).
3 System functionality
In order to provide an effective warning system, there must be confidence that the system
will function as designed on a near-continuous basis. To achieve this, there must be a
Fig. 2 Oblique view, to the southeast, showing the western side of South Peak, Turtle Mountain, and the two
main large cracks (dashed line). Shown on inset view of the cracks from the ground with people for scale
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well-defined inventory of equipment and a well-defined chain of responsibility for reviews
of the health of the system, including troubleshooting and contingency planning for repairs.
The following sections outline the specific components and protocols for ensuring func-
tionality of the system on Turtle Mountain.
3.1 Sensor network
Based on the recommendations made as part of the geotechnical hazard assessment by
BGC Engineering Inc (2000), the monitoring system on Turtle Mountain was designed to
include a number of different types of instruments communicating in near real time to a
data acquisition center located at the base of the mountain. The design process involved
defining the preliminary data requirements and reviewing options for instrument types and
locations, measurement frequency, and equipment required for data acquisition and
management. The monitoring network should provide complementary types of instruments
with varying sensitivities to movement and climatic influences and also have enough
redundancy built into the system to be able to distinguish real movement. At the end, the
aim was to have a system that will provide a reliable data stream 365 days per year, 24 h
per day in all weather and lighting conditions.
In considering the types of sensors most suitable for providing early warning for
impending slope movements, the sensors were grouped into the following categories:
3.1.1 Primary sensors
The primary sensors are those which provide a reliable data stream on a year-round basis
and that measure easily interpretable parameters of the rock mass such as length changes or
rotation. The primary sensors include ten tiltmeters, five surface wire extensometers and
twenty-two crack gauges. The surface wire extensometers and crack gauges measure
absolute displacements with submillimeter level precision while the tiltmeters measure
values of rotation in arc degrees. A list of the primary sensors, including their monitoring
resolution, typical ‘‘noise’’ values, and threshold triggers, is provided on Table 1.
3.1.2 Secondary sensors
Secondary sensors are those that measure quantifiable parameters, but which may be
subject to more variation due to environmental and other effects or have a coarser reso-
lution than the primary sensors. These cannot be relied upon to detect the subtle onsets of
movement. The secondary sensor network consists of twenty prisms with distance mea-
surements shot from a robotic total station located in the base of the valley approximately
2.5 km from the upper eastern face of the mountain and twelve single-frequency GPS
receivers. A list of the secondary sensors is provided on Table 1. Note that during normal
operation, the secondary sensors are meant as primarily characterization tools and do not
have thresholds assigned to them.
3.1.3 Tertiary sensors
Tertiary sensors provide background data that are useful in the interpretation of the results
from the primary and secondary sensors. The tertiary sensor network consists of meteo-
rological stations (rain, wind, temperature, barometric pressure) and web cameras on both
the top and the base of the mountain, as well as an outflow weir at the base of the mountain.
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Since the fall of 2003, a series of over 80 sensors has been installed around Turtle
Mountain, with a large majority concentrated on South Peak (Moreno and Froese 2006,
2009c). The network of sensors and monitoring points installed on Turtle Mountain can be
considered to span the full spectrum of monitoring as outlined by Larocque (1977). There
are sensors and monitoring points installed at various points on the mountain to detect
whether movements exist (Level 1), which aim to characterize areas of known movement
(Level 2) and near real-time sensors to provide warning (Level 3). For the sensors and
monitoring points on Turtle Mountain, the primary sensors are being used to provide
warning (Level 3), whereas the secondary sensors are used to characterize movements
(Level 2).
Continuous slope monitoring is very difficult particularly in the harsh and highly var-
iable climate conditions at Turtle Mountain. As the sensors installed are very sensitive to
deformation, they are also sensitive to temperatures fluctuations that will affect the normal
operation of the instruments and must be considered in the interpretation of data. The
primary and secondary sensors and their associated monitoring resolutions are shown in
Table 1. However, numerous efforts are being made to increase the monitoring network
reliability and this includes the addition of ground-based InSAR (Interferometric Synthetic
Aperture Radar) technology (Alba et al. 2009; Arosio et al. 2009; Bozzano et al. 2008) in
the fall 2009.
Figure 4 provides an overview of the type and distribution of sensors on Turtle
Mountain, and Table 1 provides a list of the specific sensors and expected resolutions of
each. More detail on the specifics and reliability of the various sensors has been docu-
mented by Moreno and Froese (2006, 2008a, b, 2009c).
3.2 Communication links
The success of any warning system relies not only on the adequate planning, design, and
implementation of a series of instruments, but also on a proper data-management strategy.
Table 1 List of sensors (type and numbers, resolution)




Crack gauge Primary 20 0.00625 mm 0.01 mm 5 mm
Extensometer 5 0.01 mm 0.5 mm 20 mm
Tiltmeter 10 0.0001% 0.005% 0.2%
GPS antenna Secondary 12 0.1 mm 5 mm (htal)
15 mm (vcal)
Prism 20 1 mm 10 mm
Weather station N/A





Temperature sensor 1 0.2C 0.2C N/A
Rel. humidity sensor Tertiary 1 0.01% 0.3% N/A
Pyranometer 1 0.001 kJm-2/h 0.002 kJm-2/h N/A
Barometric pressure sensor 1 0.01 kPa 0.02 kPa N/A
Precipitation sensor 1 1 mm *1 mm N/A
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This section provides an overview of the various components of the data-management
network as well as the different applications currently used for viewing data captured at
Turtle Mountain.
3.2.1 Data transmission
On Turtle Mountain, several sets of instruments of varied complexity are continuously
measuring and sending data. In considering how the data-management network handles
these records, the data stream can be grouped into the following categories:
3.2.1.1 Primary data link This is the main link between the instruments on the west side
of the mountain, where the primary sensors are located and the Provincial Building at
Blairmore. This connection is done wirelessly. From there, data are relayed to the Frank
Slide Interpretive Centre (FSIC) via a second wireless link. Data from this link cover both
primary deformation sensors (crackmeters, extensometers, tiltmeters) and other sensors
(dGPS, weather station, and thermistor string).
3.2.1.2 Secondary data link This data link covers wireless communications between the
FSIC and the Bellevue pump house (Fig. 5), the location of the electronic distance mea-
surement (EDM) system instrument. This link then covers the data feed from the EDM,
which is collecting data from the twenty prisms (secondary sensor).
Fig. 3 Comparison between the boundaries of rock avalanche run out areas from the South Peak of Turtle
Mountain as simulated by different authors
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3.2.1.3 Tertiary data link This is the link between the FSIC and data transmission points
located on the eastern side of Turtle Mountain. These data transmission points include
spring-outflow measurements, three recently installed dGPS monitoring points, and images
from a web camera installed at the top of Turtle Mountain.
All data streams received at the FSIC are written to a SQL server located in the
basement, where it can be accessed over the Alberta Supernet connection by the Turtle
Mountain monitoring system (TMMS) staff in Edmonton.
3.2.2 Data accessibility and redundancy
Remote data access is based on an Internet protocol, where the local data-management
network is connected to the Internet by a router. This router acts as the main entry portal
for monitoring the network. The network includes two main communications hubs: the
Provincial Building at Blairmore and the FSIC. While the Provincial Building provides the
wired connection to the Internet, the FSIC serves as the long-term data repository (Fig. 6).
Overall, there are two main Internet links that provide broadband access to the data: the
Fig. 4 Detailed overview of sensor network on Turtle Mountain
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Alberta Supernet and a commercial Internet provider. In the event that both Internet links
fail, there is also access to the data loggers via direct connection from a personal laptop to
the router at the Blairmore Provincial Building (BPB). This redundancy has been added to
ensure there are at least two fall-back options to access the network are available in the
event a main Internet link ceases to function. The sections below provide an overview of
how these two Internet links are used to access data.
3.2.2.1 TM client There are two applications that are currently in use for viewing data
captured at the FSIC. At regularly scheduled intervals, AGS staff access the data at the
FSIC via a custom-developed application called TMClient, which pulls data not previously
downloaded to an access database on a computer at the AGS/Energy Resources Conser-
vation Board (ERCB) in Edmonton. These data are then pulled into an Excel spreadsheet
for viewing and graphing of data. Excel is the primary application utilized in reporting data
and evaluating data trends.
3.2.2.2 ATLAS The second application utilized to view data is a commercially available
application called ATLAS (Durham Geo Slope Indicator 2009). The AGS currently sub-
scribes to the web-based version of ATLAS that accesses the data from the loggers on the
west side of the mountain and then copies it to a database housed by the company that
provides the ATLAS monitoring service. Within the ATLAS web-based software, all of the
instruments are displayed in a user-friendly manner on a plan view (photo) of the
mountain. The sensors will display their latest measurements and the current alarm level
(Fig. 7). By clicking on the measurement value, a trend plot will be created in a new
window. This allows one to quickly view data from a single sensor.
Fig. 5 Overview of communication links
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If alarm levels have been set for a sensor, the information box on the plan view will




Table 1 provides an indication of the alarm levels set for each of the primary sensors.
Annually, these values are shifted to take into account slow annual movements such that
they are not triggered by slow movement over time but rather by a sudden movement. It is
important to note that the thresholds are set in order to alert AGS staff to access and view
the data from the sensors and not to trigger a change in alert level. Accordingly, these
thresholds are set low enough to capture a significant movement but high enough not to be
triggered by annual thermal fluctuations.
At the start of each working day, the ATLAS system is accessed by AGS staff to
confirm operation. If it is not functioning and a trouble shooting routine cannot make it
operational, then Loggernet (below) is utilized to access the data directly from the data
loggers at the top of the mountain.
Fig. 6 Detailed schematic representation of the different data access strategies available for the Turtle
Mountain monitoring project
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3.2.2.3 Loggernet Loggernet is a commercially available software application devel-
oped and distributed by Campbell Scientific (2009). This application can be used to log
into a specific data logger, change settings, and/or download the near real-time stream of
data from all sensors attached. On the western side of Turtle Mountain, there are two
main data loggers (borehole and weather station) that collect data for a total of 37 of the
primary deformation sensors. By logging in remotely via the commercial Internet link at
the BPB or directly into the radios at the BPB (in the event of a disruption of Internet
service), the real-time stream from the data loggers can be viewed and data can be
downloaded.
Fig. 7 Screen shot of ATLAS user interface, showing a plan view of the mountain with sensor location and
their current alarm status. Depending on its status, the color of a data box can change from green to yellow
to red
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3.3 Maintenance, diagnosis, and repair
The system health must be regularly reviewed in order to provide confidence that it will
continue to function as required in an emergency situation. A well-defined plan for
maintenance and repair is also required to reduce the potential down time for the system as
well. The following provides the components of the TMMS system that address these
issues.
3.3.1 Daily system checks
Although there is an automated web-based application to generate and distribute alarms via
e-mail and voicemail (Sect. 3.2.2), a daily check of the health of the system is required.
This process is assigned to a specific member of the team with backup persons specified for
absences or vacation. The daily system checks are conducted at the beginning of each
business day and consist of the following steps:
3.3.1.1 Daily
• check functionality of web cameras via web link,
• check data upload vis ATLAS web interface, and
• download from FSIC server using TM Client.
3.3.1.2 Weekly
• download of data using Loggernet.
The purpose of the above checks is to ensure that the redundant data transmission links
are functioning and that the data stream from the mountain continues to perform as per
design.
3.3.2 Annual inspection and repair
As the system is located on the top of a mountain in Canada, the peak is snow covered
between late October and May. Therefore, every June a visual inspection of all instal-
lations is performed to confirm conditions and assess the need for maintenance and
repairs. This is typically undertaken over a few days and involves AGS staff and any
contractors deemed necessary. Conditions are documented, and lists of required equip-
ment are compiled and ordered for a dedicated repair trip in late July. In addition to the
annual inspection and repair trips, trips are also conducted when required to address
system malfunctions that occur during the snow-free months. To date, system mal-
functions have been of a limited enough nature during the winter months that sufficient
numbers of component have remained functioning and are able to provide warning,
and therefore, maintenance trips have not been conducted until late spring/summer.
A decision as to how many operating sensors are sufficient to have an operational system
is a judgement-based decision based on the type of sensors that are not functioning, the
spatial coverage of the existing functioning sensors, and the previous movement data.
There is no specific number that is available on which to make this determination.
A complete overview of the system performance and maintenance is outlined in detail by
Moreno and Froese (2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2009c).
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3.3.3 System manual
Both for day-to-day operation and in an emergency situation, staff need to ensure that the
system will continue to function. Therefore, it is important to be able to diagnose, trou-
bleshoot, and repair every single component of the system from the on-mountain sensors to
the network communication links. In a manner similar to manuals that come with con-
sumer electronics, a system manual has been developed for the TMMS (Moreno and
Froese 2009b). This manual is stored at a central location on the common computer
network and in hard copy format with the team members and provides detailed step-by-
step instructions to troubleshoot and repair each component of the system. This includes
bullet form instructions and decision tree diagrams to lead the reader methodically through
the steps. The system manual is a living document that is updated on real-time basis as
changes to the TMMS are made.
3.3.4 Service level agreements (SLA)
It is important to ensure that the necessary expertise is available to provide assistance in
the repair and maintenance of the system components during normal operation and in an
elevated alert condition. As it is not often practical to have expertise in geology, geo-
mechanics, instrumentation, computer hardware, and networking and communications
under one roof, agreements must be put in place with other groups or organizations. For
the TMMS, official agreements have been developed and approved by management that
confirm the availability of qualified personnel at a specified time to troubleshoot and
repair components of the computer and networking equipment on the mountain. Table 2
provides an example of the response times in the SLA, as they correspond to the alert
conditions.
4 Data review
It is important to determine who reviews data, on what frequency, how data are evaluated,
and how threshold exceedance is determined. The following outlines the various aspects of
data review implemented for the TMMS.
Table 2 Maximum allowable down time for software and network equipment associated with the various
access data methods (links) at the different alert levels
Link Access point Data Maximum down timea
Green Yellow Orange Red
A Blairmore (west side of Turtle
Mountain)
Primary 3 days 1 day 1 h 1 h
B FSICb (east side of Turtle Mountain) Secondary/historical
Data
5 days 2 days 1 day 1 day
C FSIC (east side of Turtle Mountain) Tertiary 5 days 2 days 1 day 1 day
a Measured from the time that IT network group has acknowledged the call
b Frank Slide interpretive center
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4.1 Data review procedure
Once data have been obtained, transmitted, and uploaded, a protocol must be in place to
ensure that data are reviewed on a specified frequency and in a repeatable manner. This
data review protocol comprises the overall strategy for plotting, reviewing, interpreting,
and acting upon data from the sensors installed on South Peak of Turtle Mountain. The
frequency of review ranges from daily checks of the completeness of the data to annual
reviews and interpretation of the data trends.
4.1.1 Daily
A check, during normal business hours, that the critical data transmission links are func-
tioning and data are being transmitted from the mountain and stored on the database. This
responsibility is assigned to a member of the project team with a backup for days that the
staff member is away due to schedule timed off or sick time.
4.1.2 Weekly
A PDF report is automatically generated from the ATLAS software on a weekly basis and
distributed to the project team. The report itself consists of measurement data in the form
of preconfigured graphs and alarms of the previous week.
4.1.3 Yearly
A complete review of the data trends for the entire system with interpretation of the
movement trends in relation to the visual observations on the mountain. Annual data
review and interpretation of the Turtle Mountain monitoring project can be found in the
study by Moreno and Froese (2006, 2008a, b, 2009c).
4.2 Threshold determination and exceedance review
This component includes the establishment of thresholds against which the results obtained
from the sensors are evaluated. The challenge in the development of thresholds on newly
installed instruments, as in the case of Turtle Mountain, was to provide initial trigger alarm
levels that are neither too conservative, leading to numerous false alarms, nor fail to catch
real events and provide adequate warning. Due to the limited baseline information on the
deformations at South Peak, the development of thresholds was largely based on a review
of the literature and experience with similar monitoring projects on other sites throughout
the world.
There are two main types of instrumentation thresholds that should be considered.
Exceedance of these thresholds will result in an alarm condition and/or change in alert
level:
4.2.1 Absolute thresholds
These are specific values that are set typically based on two to three standard deviations
above the instrument noise and/or known seasonal thermal fluctuations of the sensors and
rock mass. As ongoing movement occurs, it may be necessary to reset the absolute
threshold. Table 1 provides a listing of the absolute thresholds chosen for the various
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sensors based on the past performance of the sensors and understanding of the seasonal
thermal fluctuation trends.
4.2.2 Velocity-based thresholds
Velocity-based thresholds consider the rate of movement or rate of change in the rock
mass/reading. These types of thresholds are often expressed in millimeters per day or week
and are based on the experience-based judgment of a rock slope engineering specialist.
Only absolute threshold levels are provided for the instruments at Turtle Mountain. At
this time, no attempt has been made to undertake analyses to determine velocity thresholds
due to the complex nature of the rock mass and the influence of seasonal fluctuations on the
readings. As outlined by Crosta and Agliardi (2003), the development of a model to predict
failure breaks down when external conditions that vary with time and deviations induced
by seasonal and meteorological variations take place.
5 External warning and emergency response
The essential function of the AGS staff is to determine what constitutes an emergency
situation and when external stakeholders need to be notified. This requires a clear
understanding of what rate and extent of deformations on the mountain are unacceptable
and a clear line of communications to pass information to emergency responders and
municipal officials.
5.1 Alert condition stages
Based on the data obtained since 2003, the South Peak of Turtle Mountain is moving
slowly (millimeters per year) and is expected to move slowly until it accelerates prior to
collapse. Based on a review of data for similar topography and geology, it is expected that
there would be days to weeks or months of warning of a catastrophic collapse. Blikra
(2008) provides a schematic diagram of the expected velocity trends prior to collapse and
the alert conditions associated with each. A modified version of the schematic diagram is
presented in Fig. 8 as it applies to the expected velocity trends and related alert conditions
at Turtle Mountain.
Each alert level is associated with an appropriate level of action. The alert framework
may require adjustment based on experience. In addition, particular circumstances may
require deviations from the actions suggested below. The sections below provide specific
details on the responses for the various alert levels as originally outline by Froese et al.
(2005). These are based on similar alert conditions utilized for volcano warning system in
western North America (Hill et al. 2002).
5.1.1 Condition green (normal operations)
A green condition is the alert designation for normal operations including regularly
scheduled data review (Fig. 9) and field checks when at least one of the following
conditions is met:
• There are no deformations above specified thresholds, and the system is functioning
properly.
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• A threshold exceedance is detected on a single sensor, but it is determined by AGS
geotechnical personnel that this is indicative of instrument error, vandalism, or climatic
influence, or the exceedance is due to a local condition that is not considered to be a
problem with respect to overall rock mass movement conditions;
• Trends are observed on a number of instruments that are deemed by the AGS to be
within acceptable limits thus not requiring notifications to the AEMA nor changes in
alert levels.
Fig. 8 Schematic velocity/alert level sketch (after Blikra 2008)
Fig. 9 Threshold review alert decision tree
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During the green alert level, regular data summary reporting is completed and no
additional notifications would be necessary. System repairs and calibration checks are also
undertaken on an as-needed basis.
5.1.2 Condition yellow (watch)
Should a trend of systematic deformations be observed on a number of sensors and the
AGS identifies that these are likely indicative of slope deformation and not due to climatic
or other non-slope effects, and then a watch (condition yellow) would be called. Under a
watch, the AGS geotechnical personnel would phone the AEMA Duty Manager, indicating
that movements are still below levels of concern and that these agencies would be provided
with updates on a daily/weekly basis until the alert level is either lowered or raised. The
AEMA Duty Manager then notifies the MCNP and the AEMA District Officer of the alert
condition change, but no other specific action are required.
Under a watch, the recommendations by the AGS may include, but are not limited to the
following actions:
• Increasing the frequency of reviewing monitoring data;
• Increasing the frequency of data acquisition;
• Site reconnaissance/investigation (not required, discretional at condition yellow);
• Further analysis (perhaps with supplemental information from other sources, e.g.,
InSAR); and
• Lower, maintain, or raise current alert level.
From these recommendations, AGS will make a decision to lower, maintain, or raise the
alert level and initiate the necessary actions. If an alert level is raised to a warning
(condition orange) or greater, there must be follow-up of the recommended action items to
ensure that the integrity of the system is not compromised. Any change in alert condition is
relayed via telephone to the AEMA Duty Manager. Until threshold values are established,
there needs to be frequent and open discussions between the geotechnical specialist and the
internal government resource carrying out the regular data review.
5.1.3 Condition orange (warning)
In the event that the systematic deformations accelerate and visual observations of the
progression of slope movement are made, then the AGS geotechnical engineer raises the
alert level to a WARNING (condition orange). Under an orange warning condition,
deformations on the on South Peak are accelerating, leading to concern of a possible future
failure of significant portions of the peak or of the entire peak.
Under this alert condition, the AEMA Duty Manager is notified by telephone that they
should begin notifying the public (both recreational users and residents) in the vicinity of
South Peak that a failure on South Peak may occur. Other appropriate actions such as
public advice notices and evacuation preparation may be required as outlined under the
municipal emergency plan.
Due to the very serious nature of this condition and the fact that the public will be
notified, it is imperative that the determination of the warning is to be made with input by
the AGS geotechnical engineer based on the instrumentation results, visual observations
and judgment based on specific experience with rock slope failures, and interpretation of
data on other projects. The misdiagnosis of warning could lead to either a catastrophic
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collapse, not being detected in time, or the public believing that the system is unreliable
resulting in a loss of confidence.
At this stage, the message to be relayed to the AEMA Duty Manager is that there is a
concerning acceleration of slope movements on the South Peak and that the public in the
affected areas be notified with recommendations for voluntary evacuations. It is most likely
that an orange condition is reached after ongoing deformation of the peak. However, if the
deformations occur in the evening or under snow or poor visibility conditions, visual
assessment may be impaired and consideration of whether a mandatory evacuation order
should be issued until a detailed assessment could be undertaken. As the worst case
empirical estimate for a rock slide run out incorporates the highway and railway, it is
required for AEMA to notify Alberta Transportation (AT) and CPR.
During the condition orange, the AGS geotechnical engineer is available to act as the
Subject Matter Expert (SME) to provide briefings to AEMA and the MCNP as to the
technical details of the assessment and relay any changes directly to these parties during
the event.
5.1.4 Condition red (failure)
In this stage, it has been confirmed based on the instruments and detailed visual assessment
(may require a safe vantage point such as a helicopter) that a catastrophic collapse of the
South Peak appears to be imminent (within 1–3 days). At this stage, the alert level would
be raised to red, and the message delivered from the AGS to the AEMA Duty Manager is
that a catastrophic failure of all/a portion of South Peak is underway and that the potential
affected area should be evacuated, highway and rail traffic completely restricted and
emergency response personnel should be mobilized to control access and remain a safe
distance from the potential run out areas. The information flow during this stage from the
AGS/ERCB to AEMA remains as in condition orange with the external specialist on site
and providing liaison with AEMA and the municipality as the SME.
5.2 Communications (internal and external)
Effective response in the event of an elevated alert condition cannot be undertaken unless
there are clearly defined roles at the various levels of organizations involved. The fol-
lowing provides an overview of the determination of roles and responsibilities that involve
any emergency response related to Turtle Mountain.
5.2.1 Internal roles and responsibilities
The AGS is responsible for determining the appropriate alert level for a potential or actual
emergency at Turtle Mountain and for providing technical expertise to the provincial and
municipal emergency responders during an event. It is therefore important that timely and
efficient information review and delivery both internally to ERCB and externally to AEMA
be completed. In order to coordinate response from within the organization to external
organizations, a detailed manual outlining the roles and responsibilities of all involved staff
members has been developed (Moreno and Froese 2009a).
This document establishes the chain of command, identifying key individuals at ERCB
who will fill each position and clearly defining their roles and responsibilities so they
can effectively manage any alert situation. A hierarchy is also defined for reporting
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rock-displacement alerts and other critical information to appropriate individuals at each
stage of the response. Development of this communication structure was based on the
recommendations in the training material produced by United States Environmental
Protection Agency (2003). It should be noted that the number of people notified will
increase as the level of alert rises and decrease as it moves toward its completion(e.g., all
communications and notifications are internal during alert level green). To avoid false
alarms, any call for a modification of the alert level must be evaluated in the context of
typical seasonal fluctuations in displacement and experience gained over time in inter-
preting those fluctuations. This plan is designed to consider a careful evaluation of a
displacement alarm and to have the appropriate response based on that evaluation.
As part of this document, there is a clear flow of communication for notifications that
involves external parties, information technology support, technical specialists, and man-
agement. For the communication linkages, there are alternate notifications should key
members of the team be unavailable. Figure 10 provides a communication flow diagram
that would be followed should an alarm be generated by the ATLAS server.
Fig. 10 Internal communication flow
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For this structure, there has been an external party, the solicitor general’s (SOLGEN)
office that runs a 24/7 emergency desk, whose role is to verify that any alarm generated
automatically from the ATLAS server had been received and addressed by a member of the
TMMS. The SOLGEN would call a list of TMMS team members (office, mobile, home)
until a response is received and then document who had acknowledged the response. There
are also other levels of communications within the organization (ERCB) and externally to
the AEMA.
5.2.2 External communications
Once an alert condition is raised to a warning (orange), providing communication of the
change to affected residents or stakeholders becomes the responsibility of municipal and
provincial emergency management officials. At the conclusion of the sensor network
implementation in 2005, an emergency response protocol (ERP) was developed to ensure a
coordinated series of actions between various orders of government and the private sector.
This protocol provides that coordination between the provincial emergency management
agency, other provincial agencies, industry stakeholders and the municipality, and other
possible participants at the provincial and federal order of government. While the
municipality has its own Municipal Emergency Plan (MEP) that includes evacuation
protocols and tasks for municipal officials, first responders etc., this protocol is designed to
ensure the relevant organizations are notified and that appropriate coordination follows to
ensure the MCNP received the assistance and information they require to respond to and
recover from a slide emanating from the South Peak of Turtle Mountain.
The ERP is based on Alberta’s emergency management framework, which specifies that
the coordination of emergency management response and recovery begin at the municipal
order of government and escalated as required. The MCNP will take the required action in
accordance with its MEP. In accordance with the ERP call tree, AEMA will make the
necessary calls to relevant GOA ministries and private sector companies that will be
directly affected by a slide (e.g., RCMP, CPR etc.,). This call down will begin at level
orange, though individual organizations may be warned depending on input from the AGS/
ERCB technical expert. The AEMA District Officer will move to the MCNP Emergency
Operations Centre (EOC) to provide assistance and advice as required, as well as per-
forming his standard liaison function with the AEMA EOC in Edmonton. This liaison
function will include informing the AEMA EOC of any additional resources and assistance
required by the MCNP that cannot be acquired through normal channels or via mutual aid
agreements. Figure 11 provides a schematic of the function and communication flow that
would apply for alert conditions orange and red, as per the ERP.
5.2.3 Mock exercises
In order to review validity of the response plans over time and to provide a refresher to
existing staff and training for new staff, it is important to incorporate an annual emergency
exercise of some type. Gebbie et al. (2006) outline two main types of exercises: discussion-
based and operation-based. Discussion-based exercises are considered to be the starting
points in a building block approach to exercises (Gebbie et al. 2006) and are primarily used
to familiarize internal staff with existing plans and capabilities. Operation-based exercises
are more involved and are used for the purpose of assessing and validating emergency
preparedness policies, plans, and procedures and include drills, functional exercises, and
full-scale exercises (Gebbie et al. 2006).
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For the TMMS, both levels of exercise have been undertaken. On an annual basis, a
discussion-based exercise is undertaken within the organization involving members of the
TMMS team, corporate security, IT, and the emergency response group. This exercise is
classified as a table top and consists of a group working through a series of scenarios with
verbal discussion of the roles and responses for each scenario. It also serves as an
opportunity to reaffirm management commitment to resources (financial and human) to the
TMMS.
In addition to annual exercises to refresh the members of the AGS and parent organi-
zation, a larger operation-based exercise has also been undertaken including all of the
organizations that would be mobilized in the event of an elevated alert condition. This
includes the provincial emergency management agency, municipality, first responders,
utilities, transportation department, railway, and members of the TMMS team. For this
exercise, there are three groups: a simulation group, a site group, and the EOC. The
simulation group is charged with developing scenarios that are fed to the members of the
EOC group. The EOC group would then interact real time to make decisions as to response
and communicate any changes in status or instructions to the site group, The site group is
responsible for talking through actions that would happen away from the emergency
operations center, such as evacuations and road closers. Members of the TMMS team are
situated in both the EOC and simulation room for the exercise (up to 3 h) with the TMMS
member at the EOC acting as the subject matter expert to update the status of the
movements on the mountain. The exercise is then followed by a debriefing of all partic-
ipants in order to document the key lessons learned.
Fig. 11 External communication flow
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6 Discussion
For most geoengineering professionals involved with the characterization and monitoring
of hazards, the main considerations are about the types of sensors, interpretation of data,
and development of alarm thresholds. When considering the development of alarm
thresholds and the selection of appropriate sensors on which to base this, the following
should be considered:
1. Evolution of Sensor Priority: As there are many different technologies and resolutions
that are available to monitor displacement, there may be a different focus on various
sensor types over the life of the monitoring. On Turtle Mountain, while sensors such as
crackmeters with submillimeter resolution are valuable in understanding the pre-
failure displacements, their working range is exceeded long before catastrophic
movements develop. On the other end of the spectrum, like GPS, have a much coarser
resolution will shift from secondary to primary monitoring technologies once
movements exceed centimeters to decimeters. Therefore, over the life of a monitoring
project, the reliance on differing monitoring technologies will evolve.
2. Setting Automated Threshold Values: The determination of what level to trigger an
alarm on a specific sensor is not trivial. Not only do various sensors and monitoring
technologies have differing lower monitoring resolutions, but also they are impacted
differently by climatic factors. For Turtle Mountain, in the absence of any baseline
data, the trigger thresholds for alarm generation were two standard deviations beyond
the ‘‘noise’’ level generated during the first few months of operation. Table 1 provides
the standard deviation of the noise observed for each sensor and the threshold chosen
for an alarm trigger. The alarm trigger is set far below the deformation level where
concern for movements would be likely, but it is intended to provide a computer-
generated alert to the TMMS team to check the sensor data. In the event of an
acceleration of a large portion of the mountain (alert conditions yellow to red), near-
continuous expert review of data would be utilized to generate changes in alert
conditions and alarms to stakeholders, rather than the use of pre-set threshold values.
3. Importance of Understanding the Mechanism for Movement: In continuing with the
above-mentioned discussion of trigger values and alarms, an understanding of the
movement kinematics is required when interpreting the data and making decisions as
to alarm conditions. In the case of Turtle Mountain, numerous single- and multiple
sensor alarm triggers have been the result of climatic inputs (lightening, ice) or
movement of isolated blocks. These cases have highlighted the importance of looking
at the entire array of monitoring points along with a clear picture of the mechanism to
make decisions. For Turtle Mountain, recent studies by Froese et al. (in press) and
Pedrazzini et al. (in press) have utilized airborne LiDAR data and field mapping to
map unstable volumes on the eastern face of the mountain. These studies have
highlighted that the initial assumptions of the mechanics and the volume of movement
made by Allan (1931) in fact may be overly pessimistic, and in fact, it is more likely
that the eastern face of the mountain may fail in smaller volumes and therefore pose
less of a hazard. It is important to use this updated understanding when reviewing data
from discrete monitoring points.
This study outlines the important considerations in ensuring that the data can be
obtained and reviewed in a reliable and repeatable manner and that the population at risk
receives timely notification in order to avoid the hazard, thus mitigating the risk. The
specific example of the TMMS has been used to illustrate the structure of the system that is
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required to provide warning and response for a rock slide at Turtle Mountain. For the
Turtle Mountain monitoring system, although this paper has focussed on the description of
the infrastructure in place to provide warning, perhaps, the largest challenge of this type of
project is non-technical. For the specific case of Turtle Mountain, the rates of movement
are so slow (millimeters per year) that it is easy for the technical team, organizational
management, and stakeholders to lose interest in the monitoring and warning project.
Currently, the TMMS is in its sixth year of operation, and the financial expenditures have
decreased significantly as the system has become operational, and the focus has shifted to
more reliable and robust monitoring technologies. It is currently planned to have a formal
review panel formed and an evaluation of the future of the monitoring and warning system
undertaken in 2013 at the end of the first decade of monitoring to provide guidance as to
the risk and future effort.
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